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In	 a	 recent	 book	 and	 an	 article,	 Carl	 Craver	 construes	 the	 relations	 between	
different	levels	of	a	mechanism,	which	he	also	refers	to	as	constitutive	relations,	
by	 means	 of	 mutual	 manipulability	 (MM).	 Interpreted	 metaphysically,	 MM	
implies	 that	 inter‐level	 relations	 are	 symmetrical.	MM	 thus	 violates	 one	 of	 the	
main	desiderata	of	scientific	explanation,	namely	explanatory	asymmetry.	Parts	
of	 Craver’s	 writings	 suggest	 a	 metaphysical	 interpretation	 of	 MM,	 and	 Craver	
explicitly	 commits	 to	constitutive	 relationships	being	symmetrical.	The	present	
paper	 draws	 attention	 to	 this	 shortcoming	 of	 Craver’s	 account.	 The	 paper	
furthermore	 explores	 the	 option	 of	 interpreting	 MM	 epistemologically,	 as	 a	




Ever	 since	Machamer,	Darden,	 and	Craver	 (2000)’s	 landmark	 article	 “Thinking	
about	 mechanisms”,	 mechanistic	 explanations—thought	 to	 be	 the	 most	
pervasive	kinds	of	explanation	in	the	biological	sciences—have	become	a	major	
research	 topic	 in	 the	 philosophy	 of	 science.	 In	 a	 nutshell,	 Machamer	 et	 al.	
characterize	 mechanisms	 as	 being	 “composed	 of	 both	 entities	 (with	 their	
properties)	and	activities.	Activities	are	the	producers	of	change.	Entities	are	the	
things	 that	 engage	 in	 activities”	 (3).	 To	provide	 a	mechanistic	 explanation	of	 a	
phenomenon,	 then	 is	 “to	explain	how	 it	was	produced”	 by	 a	mechanism	 (ibid.).	
The	 production	 of	 the	 phenomenon	 in	 question	 by	 a	 mechanism,	 call	 it	 MPP	
(mechanistic	 production	 of	 the	 explanandum	 phenomenon),	 is	 thus	 absolutely	







of	 explanation	 captures	 one	 of	 the	 most	 important	 desiderata	 on	 accounts	 of	
explanation:	 explanatory	 asymmetry.	 Mechanisms	 explain	 phenomena,	 but	
phenomena	 do	 not	 explain	 mechanism,	 because	 mechanisms	 produce	
phenomena	 and	 not	 vice	 versa.	 The	 direction	 of	 explanation	 thus	 follows	 the	
direction	 of	 a	 mechanism’s	 production	 of	 the	 relevant	 phenomenon.	 This	
assumption	 is	 in	 fact	 analogous	 to	 an	 assumption	 made	 by	 large	 parts	 of	 the	
philosophical	 literature	 on	 causation,	 perhaps	 most	 explicitly	 put	 by	 Salmon	
(1998,	129):	“The	asymmetry	of	explanation	is	inherited	from	the	asymmetry	of	
causation”	(see	also	Strevens	2008b,	24f.	and	76‐7).	And	indeed,	although	mostly	
concerned	 with	 the	 descriptive	 project	 of	 drawing	 to	 the	 attention	 of	
philosophers	 the	 importance	 of	 mechanistic	 explanations,	 Machamer	 et	 al.	 do	
express	broad	and	general	sympathy	with	a	causal	process	theory	for	MPP	in	the	
tradition	 of	 Salmon’s	 (1984)	 early	 work	 on	 causation.	 Process	 theories	 of	
causation,	 however,	 have	widely	 been	 acknowledged	 to	 fail	 on	 various	 counts	
(Hitchcock	1995).		
	 In	 his	 recent	 book	 (Craver	 2007)	 and	 an	 article	 (Craver	 and	 Bechtel	
2006),	Craver	offers	 important	refinements	of	 the	original	mechanistic	account	
by	Machamer	 et	 al.	 Amongst	 other	 things,	 Craver	 proposes	 to	 understand	 the	
relation	between	 the	mechanism	and	 the	explanandum	phenomenon	 (i.e.,	MPP	
relation)	 in	 terms	 of	 “mutual	 manipulability”,	 which,	 by	 a	 reviewer,	 has	 been	
judged	“one	of	the	main	achievements	of	the	book“	(Levy	2009,	141).	 It	will	be	
the	purpose	of	this	paper,	to	assess	this	aspect	of	Craver’s	account.		
This	 is	 how	 I	 proceed.	 In	 Section	 2	 I	 introduce	 Craver’s	 notion	 of	 mutual	
manipulability	(MM)	as	an	explication	of	MPP.	I	argue	that	Craver’s	explication	of	
MPP	 strips	 the	 mechanistic	 account	 of	 explanation	 of	 its	 ability	 to	 capture	
explanatory	 asymmetry.	 In	 Section	 3	 I	 explore	ways	 in	which	 this	 undesirable	
consequence	might	be	avoided.	One	option	I	highlight	is	the	interpretation	of	MM	
as	a	purely	epistemological	criterion	for	identifying	MPP’s.	As	I	argue	in	Section	
4,	 however,	 there	 is	 clear	 textual	 evidence	 that	 Craver	 intends	 MM	 as	 an	
explication	 of	 the	meaning	 of	 MPP,	 which	 I	 argue	 is	 a	 genuinely	metaphysical	
project.	 Regardless,	 I	 show	 in	 Section	 5	 that,	 if	 interpreted	 in	 pure	
epistemological	 terms,	 MM	 becomes	 redundant.	 In	 Section	 6	 I	 conclude	 this	
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paper	 by	 recommending	 the	 abandonment	 of	 MM	 and	 by	 pointing	 to	 one	
characteristic	 of	mechanisms	 that	 the	 proponents	 of	 the	mechanistic	 approach	
might	 want	 to	 focus	 on	 in	 order	 to	 justify	 the	 need	 for	 special	 accounts	 of	
mechanistic	explanations.				
2 Explanatory	asymmetry	lost?		
Just	 like	 Machamer	 at	 al.	 (2000),	 Craver	 (2007,	 6‐7)	 defines	 mechanisms	 as	
“entities	 and	 activities	 organized	 such	 that	 they	 exhibit	 the	 explanandum	
phenomenon”.	 Craver’s	 (and	 Machamer	 et	 al.’s)	 standard	 example	 for	 a	
mechanistic	 explanation	 is	 the	 explanation	 of	 the	 neuronal	 action	 potential,	
which	 “is	 explained	 by	 reference	 to	 component	 parts	 of	 the	 action	 potential	
mechanism”,	whereby	 examples	 for	 component	 entities	 are	 ions,	 ion	 channels,	




,	 and	 the	 ‘upper’	 level	 is	 constituted	by	 the	phenomenon	 to	be	explained.	The	
‘mechanism	 as	 a	 whole’,	 i.e.,	 X,	 ,	 and	 the	 explanandum	 phenomenon,	 Craver	
denotes	 as	S.	 Furthermore	he	 treats	 the	phenomenon	 to	be	 explained	as	being	
equivalent	 to	S’s	activity	.	MPP	then,	 in	Craver’s	 terminology,	 is	S’s	‐ing	(i.e.	
the	 explanandum	 phenomenon)	 being	 “exhibited”	 or	 “produced”	 (Craver	 uses	
both	 terms)	 by	 the	 activities	 of	 the	 mechanism’s	 components	 (X’s	 ‐ing).	
Furthermore,	even	though	of	minor	 importance	 in	the	 following,	 for	Craver	(as	
for	 Machamer	 et	 al.)	 mechanisms	 often	 consist	 of	 multiple	 levels.	 That	 is,	 the	
upper	 level	of	one	mechanism	may	be	a	component	of	a	 lower	 level	of	another	
mechanism,	and	so	on.	More	importantly,	Craver	sharply	distinguishes	between	
intra‐level	 and	 inter‐level	 relations	 (Craver	 and	 Bechtel	 2006;	 Craver	 2007).	
Whereas	 intra‐level	 relations	 are	 causal	 relations,	 inter‐level	 relations	 are	 not;	






In	 order	 to	 elucidate	 inter‐level	 relationships	 in	 mechanisms,	 Craver	
(2007),	following	Woodward	(2003),	adopts	the	notion	of	an	ideal	intervention:	
“an	ideal	intervention	I	on		with	respect	to		is	a	change	in	the	value	of		that	
changes	,	 if	 at	 all,	 only	 via	 the	 change	 in	”	 (154).	 Interventions	 need	not	 be	
performable	by	humans,	nor	need	they	be	physically	possible.	All	that	is	required	







Apparently,	 both	 CR1	 and	 CR2	 have	 the	 structure	 of	 Woodwardian	 active	
counterfactuals,	 i.e.,	 counterfactuals	 whose	 antecedents	 are	 “made	 true	 by	
interventions”	 (Woodward	 2000,	 199),	 which	 Woodward	 intends	 to	 pick	 out	
causal	relationships.	And	yet,	Craver	denies	that	neither	CR1	nor	CR2	do	so.	As	
mentioned	 above,	 the	 combination	 of	 CR1	 and	 CR2	 (i.e.	 MM)	 is	 supposed	 to	
individuate	 constitutive	 relations,	 which,	 according	 to	 Craver,	 are	 not	 causal	
relations.	 In	accordance	with	 the	convention	 in	 the	contemporary	 literature	on	
causation	 to	 refer	 to	 a	 causal	 relation	 between	 X	 and	 Y	 as	 X	 “being	 causally	
relevant”	 to	 Y	 (cf.	Woodward	2003,	 39),	 Craver	 also	 refers	 to	 CR1	 and	CR2	 as	
criteria	 for	 constitutive	 relevance.	 More	 specifically,	 “one	 can	 change	 the	





And	 since	 inter‐level	 relationships	 are	 symmetrical	 relationships,	 they	 are	
therefore	 “only	uncomfortably	 viewed	as	 causal”	 (p.	 153).	Another	 reason	 that	








In	 fact,	 the	 account	 of	 causation	 Craver	 explicitly	 allows	 for	 ‘cyclic’	 causal	
relations	where	a	change	in	the	cause	variable	brings	about	a	change	in	the	effect	
variable	and	vice	versa	(Woodward	2003,	396).	Furthermore,	as	Leuridan	(2012,	
fn.	 27	 and	29)	 points	 out,	many	 relations	 of	 interest	 in	 neurobiology	 (Craver’s	
subject)	are	causal	feedback	loops,	i.e.,	symmetrical	causal	relationships.		
Craver’s	 explicit	 commitment	 to	 inter‐level	 relationships	 being	
symmetrical	 relationships	 raises	 the	 following	 concern:	 if	 inter‐level	
relationships	really	are	symmetrical,	what	is	 it	 in	Craver’s	account	that	ensures	
that	 the	 desideratum	 of	 explanatory	 asymmetry	 is	 respected?	 Recall,	 on	 the	
original	 mechanistic	 account	 by	 Machamer	 et	 al.,	 explanatory	 asymmetry	 is	
respected,	 because	 mechanisms	 produce	 phenomena,	 but	 not	 vice	 versa.	 The	




spelled	 out	 in	 terms	 of	 Woodwardian	 counterfactuals	 picking	 out	 causal	
relations:	
to	 say	 that	 one	 stage	 of	 a	mechanism	 is	productive	 of	 another	 (as	 I	 suggest	 in	
Machamer	et	al.	2000;	Craver	and	Darden	2001)	 is	 to	say,	 at	 least	 in	part,	 that	
one	 has	 the	 ability	 to	manipulate	 one	 item	 by	 intervening	 to	 change	 another.	
(93‐4;	added	emphasis)	
As	 mentioned	 above,	 however,	 for	 Craver	 inter‐level	 relations	 are	 not	 causal	
relations.	 So	 if	 the	 above	 quotation	 were	 to	 refer	 to	 MPP	 (i.e.	 an	 inter‐level	
relation)	 Craver	 would	 clearly	 contradict	 himself.	 So	 despite	 speaking	 of	





In	 personal	 communication,2	 Craver	 is	 ready	 to	 give	 up	 on	 a	 ‘literal’	
reading	of	MPP;	he	suggests	MPP	be	interpreted	metaphorically	instead.	That	is,	
whenever	 we	 say	 that	 the	 explanandum	 phenomenon	 is	 “produced”	 by	 the	
mechanism,	 what	 we	 should	 say	 more	 carefully	 is	 that	 the	 phenomenon	 is	
constituted	 or	 “made	 up”	 by	 the	mechanism,	 very	much	 in	 accordance	 with	 a	









absent	 from	 Craver	 and	 Bechtel’s	 joint	 paper.	 But	 again,	 construing	MPP	 as	 a	
symmetrical	 relation	 (namely	 as	 CR)	 subjects	 the	 mechanistic	 account	 to	 the	
problem	of	 explanatory	 symmetry.	 If	 the	 relation	between	 the	mechanism	and	
the	phenomenon	is	symmetrical,	what	is	it	that	prevents	us	from	saying	that	the	
phenomenon	also	explains	the	mechanism?	In	response	to	this	question,	Craver	
(personal	 communication)	 is	 ready	 to	 embrace	 a	 deflationary	 “explanatory	
pluralism”,	 implying	 that	 phenomena	 might	 as	 well	 explain	 mechanisms.	 But	
perhaps	there	are	more	appealing	options	for	Craver.		
3 Explanatory	asymmetry	saved?	
There	 is	 a	 much	 simpler	 response	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 explanatory	 symmetry	
available	to	Craver.	He	could	point	out	that	MM	is	only	part	of	how	constitutive	
relationships	 are	 to	 be	 understood.	 Another	 important	 aspect	 of	 constitutive	
relationships	 is	 that	 they	 are	 part‐whole	 relationships	 (see	 above	 and	 Craver	
2008,	153‐4).	Part‐whole	relationships	are	asymmetrical	 relationships:	 if		 is	a	





would	 thus	 be	 secured.3	 The	 problem	 with	 this	 response,	 however,	 is	 that	 it	
stands	 in	 outright	 contradiction	 with	 Craver’s	 assertion	 that	 constitutive	
relationships	 are	 symmetrical:	 either	 constitutive	 relations	 are	 part‐whole	
relations	or	they	are	symmetrical.	Craver	cannot	have	it	both	ways.	Although	the	
former	 option	 seems	 much	 more	 plausible	 in	 the	 face	 of	 the	 problem	 of	
explanatory	 asymmetry,	 part‐whole	 relations	 are	 underdeveloped	 in	 Craver’s	




property	 of	 constitutive	 relations	 and	 characterizes	 it	 as	 one	 of	 the	 crucial	
differences	between	constitutive	and	causal	relations	(Craver	and	Bechtel	2006;	
Craver	 2007).	 At	 any	 rate,	 there	 appear	 to	 be	 only	 two	 options	 for	 Craver:	 he	
either	gives	up	on	the	idea	that	constitutive	relations	are	symmetrical	or	he	tries	
to	 save	 explanatory	 asymmetry	 whilst	 holding	 onto	 constitutive	 relationships	
being	 symmetrical	 (and	 giving	 up	 on	 part‐hood).	 The	 former	 option	 appears	
much	more	plausible.	It	would	allow	Craver	to	embrace	the	asymmetry	property	
of	part‐whole	relations	and	thereby	explanatory	asymmetry.	But	because	Craver	




the	 formula	 PV=RT	 (R	 is	 the	 gas	 constant).	 Clearly	 this	 is	 a	 symmetrical	
relationship.	 We	 can	 intervene	 on	 P	 to	 change	 T,	 and	 conversely,	 we	 can	
intervene	 on	 T	 to	 change	 P	 (by	 holding	 fixed	 V,	 respectively).	 Now,	 assuming	
(with	Woodward)	that	the	ideal	gas	law	is	an	explanatory	generalization,	in	each	
of	 the	 above	 scenario,	 explanatory	 asymmetry	 is	 preserved	 despite	 the	








P	 (but	 not	 vice	 versa),	 and	 in	 the	 second	 scenario	 P	 explains	 T	 (but	 not	 vice	
versa).4	 There	 is	 of	 course	 no	 a	 priori	 reason	 why	 this	 insight	 could	 not	 be	
extrapolated	 to	 the	 context	 of	 mechanistic	 explanations.	 However	 this	
extrapolation	 is	 only	 of	 a	 limited	 sort.	 It	 extends	 only	 to	 intra‐level	 but	 not	 to	











Again,	Craver	could	simply	give	up	on	 the	symmetry	 thesis.	 Indeed,	MM	
implies	 the	 symmetry	of	 inter‐level	 relations	only	 if	 it	 is	 to	be	understood	as	 a	
metaphysical	explication	of	inter‐level	relations,	i.e.,	as	specifying	the	meaning	of	
inter‐level	 relations.	 If	 read	 in	 epistemological	 terms,	 that	 is,	 as	 a	 criterion	 for	
identifying	inter‐level	relations	(in	contrast	to,	say,	mere	correlations	between	a	
mechanism	 and	 some	 phenomenon),	 MM	 has	 no	 implications	 for	 the	
directionality	of	 inter‐level	 relations.	At	 least	a	priori,	 there	 is	no	contradiction	
between	inter‐level	relations	being	asymmetrical	and	our	means	for	identifying	
them	being	applicable	in	both	directions	of	this	relation	(i.e.,	bottom‐up	and	top‐
down).	 An	 epistemological	 interpretation	 of	 MM	 would	 also	 allow	 Craver	 to	
reconcile	 MM	 with	 the	 asymmetry	 of	 part‐hood.	 Unfortunately	 for	 Craver,	
however,	 there	 is	 strong	 textual	 evidence	 that	 Craver	 aims	 for	 a	metaphysical	
explication	of	constitutive	relevance	in	terms	of	MM.	So	before	we	can	consider	a	









to	 explicate	 the	 meaning	 of	 MPP.	 Such	 endeavor	 is	 generally	 regarded	 as	 a	
genuinely	 metaphysical.	 Second,	 Craver’s	 concession	 that	 MM	 implies	 the	
symmetry	 of	 inter‐level	 relations	 clearly	 presupposes	 that	 MM	 is	 interpreted	
metaphysically.	 Again,	 if	 MM	 were	 a	 mere	 epistemological	 criterion,	 nothing	
would	 follow	 for	 the	 direction	 of	 inter‐level	 relations.	 Furthermore,	 Craver	
makes	clear	that	he	wishes	to	provide	a	‘normative’	account	that	can	“demarcate	
[mechanistic]	explanation	from	other	kinds	of	scientific	achievements”,	and	that	
can	 “reveal	 criteria	 for	 assessing	 explanations”,	 in	 other	 words	 it	 “should	
prescribe	norms	of	explanation”	(20;	original	emphasis).	All	this	he	could	not	do	
if	he	were	to	interpret	MM	epistemologically	rather	than	metaphysically.	One	e.g.	
cannot	 assess	 whether	 an	 explanation	 is	 a	 good	 explanation	 without	 having	
provided	 at	 least	 a	 partial	 answer	 to	 the	 question	 of	 what	 constitutes	 an	
explanation,	i.e.,	a	question	about	the	meaning	of	explanation.		
	 But	 again,	 there	 are	 indeed	 also	 a	 number	 of	 passages	 in	 Craver’s	 book	
that	suggest	that	Craver	views	MM	as	an	epistemological	criterion.	Primarily,	this	
is	suggested	by	the	context	in	which	Craver	explicates	inter‐level	relations.	This	
context	 is	 formed	 by	 Craver’s	 pointing	 to	 the	 various	 inter‐level	 experimental	
strategies	 that	 can	 be	 used,	 inter‐level	 bottom‐up	 and	 top‐down,	 to	 establish	




















This,	 however,	 is	 a	 misapprehension.	 The	 fact	 that	 a	 philosophical	 analysis	 is	
non‐reductive	does	not	imply	that	it	is	non‐metaphysical.	To	see	this	requires	a	
brief	excursion	into	Woodward’s	account.		
	 Many	 philosophical	 analyses	 seek	 to	 reduce	 the	 concept	 of	 causation	 to	
another	 concept.	 Humeans,	 for	 instance,	 reduce	 causation	 to	 mere	 empirical	
regularities.	 David	 Lewis	 reduces	 causation	 to	 counterfactual	 dependence.	




it	 is	 not	 viciously	 circular,	 as	Woodward	 (2003,	 20ff.)	 points	 out,	 because	 the	






	 The	 crucial	 question	 now	 is	 of	 course:	 is	 a	 non‐reductive	 analysis	 of	
causation	 non‐metaphysical	 (as	 Craver	 would	 have	 it)?	 This	 is	 not	 an	
uncontroversial	 matter.	 In	 a	 slightly	 heated	 exchange	 with	 Strevens	 (2007,	
2008a),	 Woodward	 (2008)	 explicitly	 denies	 that	 his	 own	 account	 is	
metaphysical.	However	Strevens	 (2008)	offers	a	number	of	 convincing	 reasons	
why	Woodward	might	in	fact	be	mistaken	about	the	aims	of	his	own	book.	First,	
Woodward	(2003),	throughout	his	book,	presents	his	analysis	as	a	superior	rival	
to	 Lewis’s	 metaphysical	 analysis	 of	 causation.	 It	 would	 be	 hard	 to	 see	 why	
Woodward	 does	 that	 if	 the	 aim	 of	 his	 project	 were	 entirely	 different	 from	
Lewis’s.	 Second,	 Woodward	 seeks	 to	 provide	 an	 account	 according	 to	 which	
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This	 article	 has	 profited	 significantly	 from	 discussions	 with	 Bert	 Leuridan,	 Kareem	
Khalifa,	 and	 Petri	 Ylikoski.	 Marcel	 Weber,	 and	 Alexander	 Reutlinger.	 An	 anonymous	
referee	of	this	journal	provided	helpful	comments.	Carl	Craver	kindly	clarified	his	views	
for	me	in	personal	communication.	I’m	grateful	to	all	of	these	individuals.	I	furthermore	
want	 to	 thank	 the	 audience	 at	 the	 EPSA	 2011	 conference	 in	 Athens	 (Greece)	 for	
feedback.	
	
7 References	
Cartwright	N	(2002)	Against	modularity,	the	causal	Markov	condition,	and	any	
link	between	the	two:	Comments	on	Hausman	and	Woodward.	The	British	
Journal	for	the	Philosophy	of	Science	53	(3):411‐453.	
Couch	MB	(2011)	Mechanisms	and	constitutive	relevance.	Synthese	183	(3):375‐
388.	
Craver	CF	(2007)	Explaining	the	brain	:	mechanisms	and	the	mosaic	unity	of	
neuroscience.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.	
—	—	—	(2009)	Mechanisms	and	natural	kinds.	Philosophical	Psychology	22	
(5):575‐594.	
Craver	CF,	W	Bechtel	(2006)	Top‐down	Causation	Without	Top‐down	Causes.	
Biology	&	Philosophy	22	(4):547‐563.	
Hitchcock	CR	(1995)	Salmon	on	explanatory	relevance.	Philosophy	of	Science	62	
(2):304‐320.	
Leuridan	B	(2012)	Three	problems	for	the	mutual	manipulability	account	of	
constitutive	relevance	in	mechanisms.	The	British	Journal	for	the	
Philosophy	of	Science	63	(2):399‐427.	
Page	15	of	15	
	
Levy	A	(2009)	Carl	F.	Craver,	Explaining	what?	Review	of	explaining	the	brain:	
mechanisms	and	the	mosaic	unity	of	neuroscience.	Biology	and	Philosophy	
24	(1):137‐145.	
Machamer	P,	L	Darden,	CF	Craver	(2000)	Thinking	about	mechanisms.	
Philosophy	of	Science	67	(1):1‐25.	
Salmon	W	(1984)	Scientific	explanation	and	the	causal	structure	of	the	world.	
Princeton,	N.J.:	Princeton	University	Press.	
—	—	—	(1998)	Causality	and	explanation.	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press.	
Strevens	M	(2007)	Review	of	Woodward,	Making	Things	Happen.	Philosophy	and	
Phenomenological	Research	74	(1):233‐249.	
—	—	—	(2008a)	Comments	on	Woodward,	Making	Things	Happen.	Philosophy	
and	Phenomenological	Research	77	(1):171‐192.	
—	—	—	(2008b)	Depth	:	an	account	of	scientific	explanation.	Cambridge,	Mass.:	
Harvard	University	Press.	
Woodward	J	(2003)	Making	things	happen:	A	theory	of	causal	explanation:	Oxford	
University	Press,	USA.	
—	—	—	(2008)	Response	to	Strevens.	Philosophy	and	Phenomenological	
Research	77	(1):193‐212.	
—	—	—	(2011)	Mechanisms	revisited.	Synthese:1‐19.	
Woodward	J.	(2002)	What	is	a	mechanism?	A	counterfactual	account.	Philosophy	
of	Science	69	(3):366‐377.	
	
	
